Impartiality

"impartiality is obtained by taking the viewpoints of others into account; impartiality is not the result of some higher standpoint that would then actually settle the dispute by being altogether above the meleé."

-Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy

In Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, Arendt takes the surprising approach of drawing on Kant's aesthetics to offer a distinct interpretation of political philosophy.  She does not just turn to the Critique of Judgment alone however, but draws a line of questioning from of a number of Kant's later political writings that she then responds to with the Third Critique. Her explication of the term "impartiality" in this context is particularly striking since it offers a way between the models of objective judgment (from outside or above, so to speak) and subjective judgment (taking one's own standpoint as the measure of right).

Arendt's language marks a struggle of thinking in the middle. We're far from the high point of Plato's cave, where, even when looking down to a reflection, one wants to see the good as the sun above. Instead, the reference to "meleé" suggests that confusion and physical combat mark the scene of plural judgment. The goals is to get away from being "partial," away from taking a side and becoming just a "part" of some greater already given whole. Yet the right way to do so is not by stepping away from these positions, but by moving through them. "Account" suggests a kind of calculation, of adding up, but Arendt clarifies that it is not a matter of getting to a place from which one can survey all positions. Still, let's note that she says that one is not "altogether" above, which does retain a bit of vertical positioning.

Returning to the final word of the quote, the "meleé," makes it clear that we have to stay at the level of others. The viewpoints that one has to consider do not exist independently of each other, but are instead in conflict. How does this affect one's ability to "take them into account"? The traditional idea of detached reason would have to be modified to accept this idea of thinking in a tussle.

Later on the same page, Arendt uses a more peaceful metaphor for thinking: "To think with an enlarged mentality means to train one's thought to go visiting" (43-44). The contrast between "visiting" and "meleé" is striking, since the former term suggests that one does stay clear of trouble and merely collects impressions from others. Between the two terms, we get a sense of judgment that is not "altogether" above.

-Jeffrey Champlin