On the Justice of Institutions and of Persons: Impartiality and Dependency in Martha Nussbaum and Hannah Arendt

By Stefanie Rosenmüller (translated by Alison Borrowman)

"Menschen finden zueinander als Personen, weil sie einander bedürfen (Liebe), und leben zusammen als 'citizens', weil sie der anankaia [Naturbedürfnisse, Notwendigkeiten] Herr werden und bleiben müssen. Diese gemeinsame Herrschaft aber […] ist das eigentliche Gebiet des Handelns. […] Im Handeln, unter den Anspruch der Gerechtigkeit gestellt und dauernd versucht von der Möglichkeit, sich durch Gewalt von dem Zwang der anankaia [Naturbedürfnisse, Notwendigkeiten] zu befreien, ist der Mensch mit Anderen zusammen in der politischen Verantwortung. [...]"

"Human beings find one another as persons because they need one another (love), and they live together as ‘citizens’ because they must become and remain masters of the anankaia [natural necessities]. This collective mastery though […] is the real domain of action. […] In acting, the human being, called upon to aspire to justice and constantly tempted by the possibility of using violence to free himself from the compulsion of the anankaia [natural necessities], bears political responsibility together with others."

-- Hannah Arendt: Denktagebuch, [3] Notebook IX, April 1952, Ursula Ludz and Ingeborg Nordmann (eds.), Piper Munich Zurich 2002.

How does Arendt understand justice in acting? Social justice is of primary importance from the standpoint of social work, with which Hannah Arendt was engaged in practice but did not address in theory. How is the aspiration for social justice with respect to persons fulfilled in institutions and in the actions of individuals? Although Hannah Arendt scarcely addressed the topic of distributive justice, her reasoning could augment that of Martha Nussbaum in a useful manner. Nussbaum has criticized the application of impartiality as a principle of justice in the liberal model of John Rawls. In Arendt, it does appear to constitute a standard for just action.

 I. Justice

Aristotle distinguishes (in Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics) between the justice of persons, one of the virtues, and the justice of institutions, both private, e.g. marriage, family and economy, and political, such as law or the state. Consideration of social justice, a concept which emerged more recently, also usually involves the social, societal, or economic order, or instead the state as a whole. In another famous Aristotelian distinction, justice as iustitia particularis concerns both the just distribution of burdens, goods, rights and duties, opportunities and freedoms (iustitia distributiva), and commutative justice (iustitia commutativa), which plays a role in exchanges and contracts and is restored when damages are settled before a court after an injustice has been committed. Commutative justice is realized in social relationships, i.e., among individuals and in interactions.

II. Just Institutions

[caption id="attachment_16920" align="alignleft" width="300"] John Rawls (Source: Encyclopedia Britannica)[/caption]

Since the 1980s, concepts of distributive justice have been powerfully influenced by John Rawls’ Theory of Justice for a liberal society, in which he uses a thought experiment to create a just situation of impartial distribution. No virtues are required in this construct because a ‘veil of ignorance’ prevents anyone from making decisions for or against a rule based on personal considerations (John Rawls: A Theory of Justice 1971). Martha Nussbaum opposed aspects of the theory and, together with Amartya Sen, developed the ‘capability approach’, an Aristotelian approach that rests on 10 central capabilities representing the foundations of a good, flourishing life. Rawls' work leaves unanswered certain questions that are problematic with respect to social justice, i.e., in the traditional terms, the cases of the widows, orphans, the disabled, the poor and the disadvantaged. There are, thus, 'frontiers' (cf. Martha Nussbaum: Frontiers of Justice 2007) beyond which Rawlsian justice does not reach, or, in other words, impartiality has its defects.

Decisions determining what is to be distributed already entail an important assessment: from the Aristotelian standpoint, affluence, the maximization of assets and property, does not, per se, constitute anything good. Instead, this form of justice favors certain concepts of good that center on the competition for money, power, and respect. According to Nussbaum, material goods are not valuable per se, although they can be useful. Their value is determined by the important activities that they are used to promote or obstruct. Nussbaum, expanding on the Aristotelian concept, says that the good life encompasses equal access to education and information and the integration and empowerment of all human beings (with their respective disabilities, respective immovable barriers, and social and gender differences). The mandate of political and societal institutions is not only to guarantee independence but also to conceive forms of interaction that are worthy of human beings and do not entail slavish dependency. In Nussbaum, just as in Aristotle, the concept of the good life does extend beyond life as an isolated being. One can read the list of central capabilities like a list of basic rights in the sense of positive freedoms, freedoms which are the subject of decision-making by individuals. Shaping those freedoms is a matter for individuals (cf. Ingrid Robeyns: The capability approach: a theoretical survey, Journal of human development 6 (1), 2008.)

III. Performance of Just Actions Between Persons

Both concepts, Nussbaum’s and Arendt’s, represent attempts to understand freedom in a positive sense as scope for action in which the presence of other human beings is taken into consideration rather than only in a negative sense--that is, as independence, as autonomy and freedom from compulsion. In many instances, though, the declared objective of social work is the independence and autonomy of clients, and with Nussbaum we have now called the limitations of that objective into question. Where does this thought take us?

The care vs. control dilemma is perhaps a defining one in social work because decisions taken in that field can have powerful impacts on the lives of clients. At issue here are interpersonal actions, i.e., in this area the level of social justice of institutions interlaces with social justice as commutative, compensatory justice among persons, enlarging the concept of social justice somewhat. This requires a concept of freedom that considers the dilemma rather than obscures it. The knowledge asymmetry and the power divides between social workers and the people they assist must not be denied; they must be taken into consideration and, to the extent possible, remedied. There is a risk here of confusing different reciprocities associated with commutative justice. In exchanges and sales, the power is equally balanced, whereas in solidarity and aid, it is certainly not. Someone who needs help receives help, and someone who can help helps. Services rendered need not be equivalent to services received. What counts is the need for assistance and the ability to assist. So I would like to draw on arguments from Hannah Arendt to make an addition to Nussbaum’s proposal. For in Nussbaum’s Aristotelian approach lays a risk that the objective list of central capabilities may result in the imposition of a certain notion of the good life rather than support the expanding scope of action of individuals.

Let us follow Arendt’s lead and use judgment and the Kantian maxims of sensus communis. Unlike the other senses, sensus communis is not localized in the individual, like an organ. Instead, it is the ‘root and principle’ (Hannah Arendt: The Life of the Mind) of the exterior senses. To arrive at true impartiality, in Arendt’s view, one visits the various different viewpoints rather than abstracting oneself from those viewpoints. Does that not require empathy, as well? Nussbaum’s theory of solidarity entails the involvement of emotion. According to Arendt, though, empathy stands in opposition to impartial judgment. Empathy seems necessary for someone attempting to perceive and feel the frame of mind and situation of the other person. Yet according to Arendt, it is primarily the distanced impartiality of judgment that is important if one is to do justice to the other person. Sensibility, drawing on experience and imagination, is necessary for the purpose of sensing and identifying the assessments of the other person so that one can arrive at a relatively general standpoint--not in order to take on the assessments of the other person (compare Hannah Arendt: Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy. ed. Ronald Beiner).

[caption id="attachment_16923" align="aligncenter" width="601"] Volume 1, illustartion accompanying "Sensus communis: An Essay on the Freedopm of Wit and Humour", p. 39. (Source: Online Library of Liberty)[/caption]

Is it possible to break down the asymmetry of power and the care vs. control dilemma in social work through this kind of distanced understanding? To address that question, I would like to put forth one tradition addressing the meaning of sensus communis dating back to the 18^th century, which Arendt indirectly takes up when she, time and again, speaks of the importance of laughter for understanding. This meaning can be traced back to Lord Shaftesbury (see Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper Earl of, "Sensus Communis: an essay on the freedom of wit and humour", in Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, London (1714) [1711]), who said: through wit! ‘Wit and humour’ are the tools of common sense in conversation with which we rouse one another and “ polish one another, and rub off our corners and rough sides…”, Shaftesbury 1714). We can use provocations to shake up the pattern of isolated obstinacy of the other person. However, there are no pre-set conventions governing the rules of conversation. The only rule governing behavior is that the wit may not be ‘gross’; it may not be condescending or malicious, though it is permitted to have a little friendly sting. This wit evidently opposes hierarchies: instead of excluding other people, it draws them into conversation, and it does so not by helping them but on an equal footing whose truth is determined by collective negotiation . This is a pugnacious and plural notion of sensus communis which is quite central to Arendt and can serve as a corrective element in an attempt to act justly with others and to determine collectively what the good life should consist of.

(Featured image credit: nolimitpicturesE+Getty Images)